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I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
IN THE November Oscar case,1 which will be considered in
greater detail below,2 the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
brought a prosecution against the commander of a Boeing 747
who made a deflected bad-weather approach while attempting
to land at London's Heathrow Airport. The aircraft descended
to seventy-five feet over buildings and roads outside the airport
perimeter before reversing its descent. Charges were brought
against the commander, Capt. Glen Stewart, under what are
now Articles 55 and 56 of the Air Navigation Order 1995, 3 and
he was convicted on one charge and acquitted on the other.
The prosecution was controversial and raises serious questions
about the policy underlying the decision to institute it.
The term "professional pilot," as used in this paper, means,
broadly, a person engaging in such flying as makes it necessary
that he or she should hold an airline transport pilot's license
(ATPL) or a commercial pilot's license.4 The intention is to ex-
clude from the discussion the holder of a private pilot's license
(who is generally prohibited from flying for payment) 5 and the
holder of an ATPL who happens to be flying on a particular
occasion under circumstances in which a private pilot's license
would be adequate (for example, someone on a recreational
flight or a flight on personal business). Within this paper, there-
fore, discussion is limited to pilots whose occupation is flying on
scheduled or chartered services.So defined, the prosecution of a professional pilot in the
United Kingdom is a rare event. This paper examines questions
of procedure and evidence in English criminal law which the
case appears to raise with regard to such proceedings. An at-
tempt is made, as well, to determine the policy underlying such
prosecutions.
November Oscar refers to the last two registration letters of the aircraft involved
in the incident, G-AWNO. Since the case is unreported, this paper relies on what
is probably the fullest generally available account of the case, an article by Ste-
phan Wilkinson, The November Oscar Incident, PILOT, Feb. 1994, at 32.
2 See infra Part III.
3 S.I. 1995, No. 1038 (Eng.) [hereinafter Air Navigation Order 1995). Articles
55 and 56 of Air Navigation Order 1995 repealed and replaced, in identical
terms, articles 50 and 51 of the Air Navigation Order 1989, S.I. 1989, No. 2004.
All references are to the current Order, as the wording of relevant articles is
unaltered though the numbering is different.
4As defined by Air Navigation Order 1995, supra note 3, at sched. 8.
5 See id. at art. 118 and sched. 8.
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Three provisions of law are significant in this examination of
the potential liability of pilots and aircraft owners for unsafe op-
erations of aircraft. The first, subsection 81 (1) of the Civil Avia-
tion Act of 1982, provides as follows:
Where an aircraft is flown in such a manner as to be the cause of
unnecessary danger to any person or property on land or water,
the pilot or the person in charge of the aircraft, and also the
owner thereof, unless he proves to the satisfaction of the court
that the aircraft was so flown without his actual fault or privity,
shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
[level 4 on the standard scale6 ] or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding six months or to both.7
The second and third relevant provisions, -Articles 55 and 56 of
the Air Navigation Order 1995, read:
55. A person shall not recklessly or negligently act in a manner
likely to endanger an aircraft, or any person therein.
56. A person shall not recklessly or negligently cause or permit
an aircraft to endanger any person or property.8
The first of these three provisions would be difficult to en-
force in respect of incidents taking place outside the United
Kingdom against foreign defendants, 9 and it is, in any event, of
more restricted application than Articles 55 and 56 of the Air
Navigation Order 1995, which are framed in wider terms. Sub-
section 81(1) was in fact not used in the November Oscar case. It
is not applicable extra-territorially, and it would have been un-
available in at least one of the incidents in the sample below
even assuming that its terms might otherwise be held to have
covered the incident concerned. Accordingly, this paper will
concentrate on the two offences created by the Air Navigation
Order 1995.
The law in the two articles bears examination, for its meaning
is not entirely clear, especially in view of the interpretive
problems concerning the words "recklessly or negligently,"
6 Following the Criminal Justice Act, 1982, § 37 (Eng.), -the maximum fines
which may be imposed by a magistrate's court are fixed by reference to standard
scales in most post-1982 legislation which creates summary offences. This en-
ables the Home Secretary to vary the scales in line with the changing value of
money. In 1995, level 4 was a maximum of£2,500. There is no limit on the fine
which the Crown Court may impose.
7 Civil Aviation Order Act, 1982, § 81(1) (Eng.).
8 Air Navigation Order 1995, supra note 3, at arts. 55, 56.
9 1 CHRISTOPHER SHAWCROSS & K. M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAw, Issue 58, § IV, 106
(Peter Martin et al. eds., 4th ed. 1995).
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which will be discussed below. Further, it is hard to ascertain a
consistent policy or pattern underlying any decision to prose-
cute under the two articles.
A point worth noting is that the articles do not make actual
harm to property or persons a prerequisite for criminal liability.
It appears that these matters would be covered by the Criminal
Damage Act'1971, Which makes it an offence (1) to intentionally
or recklessly destroy or damage th6 property of another without
lawful excuse, 10 or (2) to destroy or damage any property "in-
tending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of
another or being reckless as to whether the life of another
would be thereby endangered."" In addition, the usual body of
law governing various forms of homicide and lesser offences
would doubtless apply.
As a practical matter, there is a significant overlap between
the two articles in the Air Navigation Order 1995.12 It is likely
that a situation in which any person or property is endangered
would also involve danger to an aircraft or to any person
therein. It is difficult, therefore, to see how one could contra-
vene either one of the articles without contravening the other.
The key difference between the two articles would seem to be
that one refers to acting-in a manner likely to endanger an air-
craft, while the other uses the phrase "cause or permit any per-
son or property to be endangered."13 It is suggested here that
the latter phrase is apposite to the situation where the aircraft
itself is used as the tool or device whereby danger is caused,
though not a great deal appears to hang from this distinction.
The real difficulty in interpreting the articles, however, stems
from their use of the words "recklessly or negligently," as noted.
These terms have been the source of very great difficulty in Eng-
lish law for years, and their meaning has become highly techni-
cal. Unfortunately, the meanings derived in the other contexts
in which the words have been considered do not carry over eas-
ily into the interpretation of the Air Navigation Order 1995.
One might think that driving a motor vehicle and piloting an
airplane are sufficiently analogous that legislation regulating
bad driving and bad flying would be similar. In fact, this is not
so, despite the fact that some legal reasoning concerning driving
10 Criminal Damage Act, 1971, § 1(1) (Eng.).
I' Id. § 1(2)(b).
12 Air Navigationl Order 1995, supra note 3, at arts. 55, 56.
13 Id. at art. 56.
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a motor vehicle is relevant to the interpretation of Articles 55
and 56. The Road Traffic Act 1988 defines the offence of dan-
gerous driving in the following terms: "A person who drives a
mechanically propelled vehicle dangerously on a road or other
public place is guilty of an offence."1 4 It should be noted that
the language contains no reference to any particular state of
mind; on the face of the statute, the fact that the driving is dan-
gerous suffices f6r a conviction. But in fact, it is not as simple as
that because one must consider whether the section should be
interpreted to penalize someone whose vehicle is the cause of
danger in the absence of any blameworthy state of mind on the
part of the driver. In other words, one must ask whether the
offence described in the Act is one of strict or absolute liability.
Section 2A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 offers a definition of
dangerous driving which goes a long way toward answering that
question as pertains to that section. In summary, it states that
driving is to be regarded as dangerous if it "falls far below what
would be expected of a competent and careful driver" and "it
would be obvious to [such a] driver that driving in that way'....
[or] driving the vehicle in its current state would be danger-
ous." 15 Moreover, in determining whether the driving is danger-
ous, the section instructs that "regard shall be had to
circumstances shown to have actually been in the knowledge of
the accused and not only to the circumstances of which a com-
petent and careful driver would have been aware." 16 The effect
is to ensure that the defendant's state of mind is to be tested
subjectively and not objectively.
This interpretation has not been extended explicitly to the
Air Navigation Order 1995,'7 and the question which arises is
whether the words "recklessly or negligently" can be interpreted
similarly in order to achieve the same effect. Article 111(2) of-
fers some help; it states:
If it is proved that an act or omission of any person which would
otherwise have been a contravention by that person of a provi-
sion of this Order or of any regulations made thereunder was
due to any cause not avoidable by the exercise of reasonable care
14 Road Traffic Act, 1988, § 2 (Eng.), as substituted by Road Traffic Act, 1991,
§ 1.
15 Road Traffic Act, 1988, § 2A.
16 Id.
17. Air Navigation Order 1995, supra note 3, at arts. 55, 56.
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by that person the act or omission shall be deemed not to be a
contravention by that person of that provision. 8
But as Articles 55 and 56 require recklessness and negligence,
one must ask whether this means that a defendant who exercises
reasonable care would not be guilty of an offence. Further, Arti-
cle 111 (1) imposes liability for contraventions on the operator
or commander of an aircraft unless it is proved that the act or
omission occurred without consent or connivance and that "all
due diligence to prevent the contravention" was exercised. 9
The flavour of the provisions seems to be that the exercise of
reasonable care or of all due diligence to prevent the contraven-
tion is inconsistent with recklessness or negligence in Articles 55
and 56. Certainly, from the meaning given to recklessness in
manslaughter cases, this interpretation seems to be reasonable.
In the most recent authority, R. v. Adomako,2° Lord Mackay LC
referred with approval 21 to the judgment of Lord Atkin CJ in
Andrews v. DPP,22 in which the latter said that recklessness sug-
gests an indifference to risk.23 R. v. Adomako compresses the
rather fuller statement in R. v. Caldwelt4 by Lord Diplock:
"Reckless" as used in the new statutory definition of the mens rea
of these offences25 is an ordinary English word. It had not by
1971 become a term of legal art with some more limited esoteric
meaning than that which it bore in ordinary speech, a meaning
which surely includes not only deciding to ignore a risk of harm-
ful consequences resulting from one's acts that one has
recognised as existing, but also failing to give any thought to
whether or not there is any such risk in circumstances where, if
any thought were given to the matter, it would be obvious that
there was.26
This interpretation has been confirmed in subsequent cases.
It is now established that "reckless" covers both cases where the
defendant disregards recognised risks and cases where "a rea-
sonable man, in the defendant's position, performing the very
18 Id. at art. 111 (2).
19 Id. at art. 111(1).
20 [1994] 3 All E.R. 79 (1994).
21 Id. at 86.
22, [19371 2 All E.R. 552 (1937).
23 Id. at 556.
24 11981] 1 All E.R. 961 (1981).
25 The House of Lords was considering the Criminal Damage Act, 1971, and it
is submitted that .the word would now carry the same meaning in any statute for
all practical purposes.
26 Caldwel4 [1981] 1 All E.R. at 966.
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act which the defendant intentionally performed, would have
realised that he was exposing another or others to an apprecia-
ble risk of injury or damage to property."27
The meaning of the expression "a reasonable man.., would
have realised" is significant. This is an objective test, and it
raises the question of how one determines what a reasonable
man would have recognised. This is not something which is
amenable to evidence, and, in practice, it is left to the jury which
constitutes, in theory at least, a random sample of individuals
which can conclude what is ahd what is not reasonable.
Recklessness is, however, not a state of mind which hangs in
the air as an abstract matter; it can only be considered in a par-
ticular context, and it is worth noting that, in the cases noted, all
of the judges had to explain themselves by reference to the ac-
tual case at hand or to hypothetical situations. Caldwell was a
case of arson under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, and Lord
Diplock was referring specifically to it when he used the words
quoted; 28 Adomako was a case of manslaughter; and Reid was a
case of causing death by reckless driving. It should be noted
that the Road Traffic Act 1991 abolished both this offence and
that of reckless driving, and not only replaced them with the
offences of "dangerous driving" and "causing death by danger-
ous driving," but at the same time stated how the term "danger-
ous driving" is to be understood.29
The offences in Articles 55.and 56, however, may also be com-
mitted "negligently." This must presumably carry a different
meaning from "recklessly." Once again, English law is uncom-
fortable with the term. The view taken by Smith and Hogan in
the latest edition of their authoritative text is that, as with reck-
lessness, negligence involves a failure to comply with an objec-
tive standard of conduct.30 They offer the following succinct
definition:
Negligence is conduct which departs from the standard to be ex-
pected of a reasonable man. This is not to say that a person's
state of mind is always irrelevant when negligence is in issue. He
may, for example, have special knowledge which an ordinary per-
son would not possess. The question then is, whether a reason-
able man, with that knowledge, would have acted as he did. 1
27 R. v. Reid, [1992] 3 All E.R. 673, 683 (1992).
28 CaldwelI [1981] 1 All E.R. at 966.
- Road Traffic Act, 1988, § 2A.
30 J. C. SMITH & BRiAN HoGAN, CRIMINAL LAw 92 (7th ed. 1992).
31 Id. (emphasis in original).
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This brings the meaning of the term very close to that of reck-
less. The special knowledge is that of the defendant, and the
test becomes subjective. For all practical purposes, it is sug-
gested, the effect of the defence provided by Article 111(2)32 is
to merge the concepts of recklessness and negligence where
they occur in Articles 55 and 56. It is hard to visualise any situa-
tion where there has been a failure to exercise reasonable care
that could not be fairly described as either recklessness or negli-
gence as considered above.
II. EVIDENTIAL MATTERS
The effect of the offences created by the Air Navigation Order
1995 33 is to make it likely that expert evidence will be required
in cases where recklessness or negligence are at-issue. This is so
because the piloting of an aircraft is a skilled activity outside the
experience of most persons who will constitute the tribunal of
fact. The concepts of recklessness and negligence do not exist
in vacuo, and therefore, where the test is that of a reasonable
man in the defendant's position, that test must, in airline cases,
refer to a reasonable pilot so situated. Further, the burden is on
the defendant to prove that either all due diligence 34 or reason-
able care35 was exercised. Inevitably, these questions are likely
to involve technical matters on which expert testimony will be
required.
As a general rule, English law is reluctant to admit opinion
evidence on the ultimate issue-that is, the very matter which
the court must decide. It is possible, however, that such evi-
dence may be allowed, and where an expert gives evidence, care
may need to be taken in its presentation. In a critical review of
this exclusionary rule, Keane explains, "The justification of the
rule is that in so far as such evidence might unduly influence the
tribunal of fact, it prevents witnesses from usurping the function
of the court: witnesses are called to testify, not to decide the
case."3 6 But he adds that "the rule is often of no more than
semantic effect," and he makes the rather cynical observation
that, provided the opinion of the expert witness is expressed in
32 Air Navigation Order 1995, supra note 3, at art. 111 (2).
33 Id. at arts. 55, 56.
34 Id. at art. 111(1).
35 Id. at art. 111 (2).
36 ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 407 (3d ed. 1994).
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terms different from those which will be used when the matter is
subsequently adjudicated, the testimony is admitted. 7
In fact, the matter is rather simpler and clearer than Keane
seems to admit. Richard May notes that there are, in fact, good
reasons for allowing an expert to express an opinion on the ulti-
mate issue and summarises the reasons thus: it may be artificial
for the witness not to express an opinion, for the opinion may
have been obvious from the expert's evidence; and the defence
may be hampered if the expert cannot be asked about the issue
"in the most direct way."38
In R v. Turner,9 Lawton LJ said:
An expert's opinion is admissible'to furnish the court with scien-
tific information which is likely to be outside the experience and
knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts, a judge or
jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the opin-
ion of an expert is unnecessary.4°
The court explained that the purpose of the expert's opinion
evidence is to supply information which is not within the knowl-
edge of the court but which it is necessary to know for the pur-
pose of determining guilt.41 '
However, it must be understood that Turner's case was one
involving expert psychiatric evidence. There is force in the ar-
gument that the acceptability of the opinion of a particular ex-
pert should be considered in light of the public's view of the
status of the body of knowledge concerned, and this was a factor
that has influenced decisions on admissibility in Turner and sub-
sequent cases. If the rule in Turner is taken to be the second
sentence in the passage quoted above, then in cases in which the
question is simply whether a normal person has behaved nor-
mally, an expert's opinion is unlikely to be allowed.42 However,
in the case of prosecutions under Articles 55 and 56 of the Air
Navigation Order 1995, it seems probable that an expert opin-
ion on the ultimate question, namely whether or not a defend-
ant pilot was reckless, will now routinely be admitted.
There is but a single reported English case of a prosecution
for these two offences, and the trial seems to have proceeded
37 Id.
38 RICHARD MAY, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 159 (3d ed. 1995).
39 1975 Q.B. 834 (1974) (Eng. CA.).
40 Id. at 841.
41 Id.; see also MAY, supra note 38, at 162.
42 See 1& D. Mackay & Andrew M. Colman, Excluding Expert Evidence: A Tale of
Ordinary Folk and Common Experience, 1991 CiuM. L. REv. 800, 802.
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without the issue having been expressly canvassed. In R. v.
Warburton-Pitt43 the defendant had been taking part in a flying
display with a microlight aircraft; on becoming airborne he had
to bank to avoid some trees, and the microlight stalled and
came down into a crowd of people, killing one and injuring sev-
eral more. No mechanical defect was found to explain what had
occurred. Under cross-examination, one of the prosecution's
expert witnesses said that the defendant "had been reckless in
not aborting his take-off" under the particular circumstances of
his proposed display flight then prevailing.
This is a strong case, for the remarks which the Court of Ap-
peal made about the expert evidence were addressed to the sub-
mission by appellant's counsel that the trial judge had dealt
inadequately with the material. It appears from the report that
no objection was taken against the expert evidence per se. In-
deed, it is clear that it was generally regarded as quite proper,
and the Court of Appeal seems to have implicitly accepted this.
to be so when it rejected the criticism of the trial judge's treat-
ment of it:
Having read with care the transcript of the summing-up, we have
come to the view that there is nothing in this criticism .... [T] he
judge made it quite clear to the jury that it was their decision,
and theirs alone, and nobody else's in the case. He had already
advised them to bear in mind the criticisms made by counsel on
either side about the evidence given by the witnesses. We have
no doubt that these criticisms had been fully developed in coun-
sel's speeches to the jury immediately before the summing-up.
In our view the learned judge dealt adequately with the evidence
given by the experts, and there is nothing in this ground of
appeal.'
One must conclude that the case confirms what appears to be
established practice: in prosecutions under Articles 55 and 56 of
the Air Navigation Order 1995, an expert will be permitted to
state an opinion on the ultimate issue, and the trial judge must
deal with this by making it clear to the jury that, notwithstanding
that the expert has expressed an opinion on a particular matter,
this is nonetheless one for the jury to decide. In other words, on
charges of reckless flying under Articles 55 or 56 of the Air Navi-
43 92 Crim. App. 136 (1990). The defendant was actually prosecuted under
the Air Navigation Order 1980, S.I. 1980, No. 1965, arts. 45 and 46. These arti-
cles were identical to Articles 55 and 56 of the Air Navigation Order 1995, S.I.
1995, No. 1038.
44 Id. at 142.
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gation Order 1995, expert witnesses may properly be asked
whether, in their opinions, the defendant was reckless or negli-
gent even though these are the very issues which the jury must
determine.
It is worth noting, in passing, that in the Eleventh Report of
the Criminal Law Revision Committee45 consideration was given
to the role and admissibility of expert evidence. The Committee
drew attention to the point that such evidence, where it in-
cluded an opinion on the ultimate issue before the court, was
strictly inadmissible on the grounds that the expert is thereby
usurping the function of the court or jury, and it noted the ten-
sion that had developed between this rule and current practice,
which tends to admit the evidence much more freely than in the
past. The Committee observed:
This is natural, because it would often be artificial for the witness
to avoid, or to pretend to avoid, giving his opinion on a matter
merely because it is the ultimate issue in the case and because his
opinion on the ultimate issue may be obvious from the opinions
he has already expressed.46
The Committee concluded that the restriction on expert evi-
dence probably no longer existed in the context of criminal pro-
ceedings, and in its draft bill proposed its final abolition.
III. THE CASE OF NOVEMBER OSCAR 7
The law reviewed above is of some significance in view of com-
ments which have been made following what appears to be the
rare prosecution in the United Kingdom of a professional pilot.
This is an unreported case which came to trial in 1991. A British
Airways Boeing 747-100 was attempting to make a Category II
landing in thick fog at London's Heathrow Airport and deviated
from the centre-line of the runway; the airplane made a go-
around after descending to seventy-five feet outside the airport
fence, which was parallel to a busy road, and was flying just five
feet higher than a nearby hotel. The captain was subsequently
prosecuted under both Articles 55 and 56 of the Air Navigation
45 CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT: EVIDENCE (GEN-
ERAL), 1972, CMND 4991.
46 Id. 1. 268, at 155.
47 As explained supra note 1, the November Oscar case is unpublished, and this
paper relies on what is probably the fullest published account generally available:
Stephan Wilkinson, The November Oscar Incident, PILOT, Feb. 1994, at 32; see also
Geoffrey Cooper, Safety and the Criminal Law, AEROSPACE, July 1991, at 14
(summarising instructions by the trial judge to the jury).
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Order 1995. Paradoxically, he was convicted (by a majority of
ten against two of the jury) only of recklessly endangering the
aircraft (Article 55) and was acquitted on the charge of endan-
gering people on the ground (Article 56)."' The case for the
prosecution was essentially that the captain failed to initiate the
go-around expeditiously, and much of the defence was based on
evidence of what one might call cockpit resource management
problems; amongst other factors, the Instrument Landing Sys-
tem (ILS) equipment on the aircraft was troublesome, and the
first officer was both ill and too inexperienced to assist in a Cate-
gory II landing (despite having been given a special dispensa-
tion to do so). 49 There were other factors as well, such as the
holding fuel state and the conduct of the air traffic controller.
The case has caused a great deal of comment, both at the
time it was tried and since. One of the issues raised at that time
was that the use of a lay jury and a judge who was not exper-
ienced and aufait with the technical issues was an unsatisfactory
feature of such trials. For example, in his account of the Novem-
ber Oscar trial, Wilkinson draws attention to the fact that the trial
judge asked where the flight engineer sits on a Boeing 747.50 In
letters to the press after the trial, the defendant made the samepoint and added that a British court is not the correct forum for
a technically immensely complex case.51
The case has caused a great'deal of comment on other mat-
ters as well: opinions were deeply divided about the outcome,
and the jury's paradoxical verdicts probably reflect its members'
unease with the liability issue. Further unease has been ex-
pressed about the implications of the prosecution for safety,
with attention being drawn to the need to preserve the confi-
dence of pilots and others in the voluntary reporting scheme
operated by aircrew and Air Traffic Control staff, which relies on
strict anonymity. Further, the prosecution policies of the Civil
Aviation Authority have been questioned, a point considered
below.
The issue of whether ordinary courts are a suitable forum for
such cases should be considered in the context of the nature of
expert evidence and the role in practice of the judge and jury in
a British criminal trial. The point has been made in other con-
48 Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 33-34.
49 Id. at 34.
50 Id. at 37.
5' Letters, THE LOG, Oct. 1991, at 4; CAA Prosecutions, PILOT, Aug. 1991, at 52.
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texts that certain types of cases, by virtue of the technical issues
involved, are unsuited to trial by jury. The matter was consid-
ered by the Royal Committee on Criminal Justice," which drew
attention to the evidence which it heard in this regard:
We were told by forensic scientists and other expert witnesses
that in their view the trial process was ill-suited to the objective
presentation of expert evidence. The process of examination
and cross-examination is, according to this view, sometimes ex-
ploited by skillful counsel in such a way as to give to the evidence
a slant that is neither objective nor scientific. Some of the foren-
sic science respondents ... were critical of the fact that counsel
for the prosecution were sometimes ill-prepared .... Some also
expressed the view that defence lawyers frequently appeared to
lack sufficient understanding of scientific evidence to enable
them to subject it to adequate scrutiny or to highlight its limita-
tions ....
The Royal Committee did not accept these views. It made it
clear that its response and recommendations on these and other
matters applied just as much to other fields of expertise as to
forensic science.54
As noted, several issues are involved. First, in the November
Oscar case the fact that the judge presiding over a trial by jury
asked where the engineer sat on a Boeing 747 is not evidence of
a flaw in the procedure, even if it does suggest that the trial
judge might know little about airplanes. The respective func-
tions of the judge and jury are such that the judge may feel that,
regardless of whether he or she knows the answer to a question,
it may be necessary to ask it in order to ensure that the point is
clarified for the jury. The judge controls the admission of evi-
dence,55 and it lies within the discretion of the judge to con-
clude that particular issues need to be clarified. In their
authoritative study of the English criminal justice system, Sand-
ers and Young write:
In an adversarial system, the decision makers are meant to be
passive. It is no part of the jury's role to investigate matters for
itself away from the courtroom. Jurors can ask questions but
rarely do so.... It follows thatjuries must reach their verdicts on
the material that is placed before them by counsel for the prose-
52 ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, CMND 2263.
53 Id. 70.
54 Id. 80.
55 STEVE UGLOW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 178 (1995).
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cution and the defence. This material is itself shaped by the
rules of criminal procedure and evidence.56
It is not material, in other words, whether or not the judge
knew where the engineer sits in a Boeing 747, or understood
how the complex ILS and other equipment functioned. What is
important is that the jury should have sufficient understanding
of these to reach a conclusion, and the difficulties involved in
elucidating these matters are no more a barrier to justice than
in any other criminal trial involving complex technical matters.
No convincing evidence exists that trials conducted by skilled
practitioners are generally unsuited to dealing with difficult is-
sues of fact. This claim, however, must not be read to mean that
there is no other possible procedure or that the British system
cannot be improved. Nothing more is being said than that a
court consisting of either a Bench of magistrates or a competent
judge with a randomly-selected lay jury, serviced by skilled and
ethical advocacy, comprises in principle an efficient engine for
presenting, testing, and reaching a conclusion on evidence.
The truth of this statement depends on the whole system de-
scribed being located securely in the British culture of criminal
justice. One cannot dispel from consideration that those who
use the paradoxical outcome of the November Oscar case as evi-
dence to the contrary would not make their point had there
been an acquittal on both charges.
Indeed, one may well argue that the November Oscar verdict is
evidence not of the weakness of the procedure involved, but
rather of its strength. Notably, experienced commentators ap-
pear to be divided about the case. For example, in his authorita-
tive analysis of the facts, Wilkinson describes very fairly his own
doubts about the case.5 7 That Wilkinson had such doubts dem-
onstrates that the contradictory verdicts reached by the jury
could indeed accurately reflect peer opinion.
It is unfortunate that the matter was not taken on appeal.
The contradictory verdicts do not reflect a satisfactory situation,
but we must be clear where the problem lies: the decision to
expose an individual to the hazards of a criminal trial must be
based on sound and consistent policy. This theme will be devel-
oped below.
Certainly, the evidence in the November Oscar case was un-
doubtedly complex, and various expert witnesses contributed to
56 ANDREW SANDERS & RICHARD YOUNG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 369 (1994).
57 Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 38.
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it. The issues involved the operation, use, and reliability of an
ILS; cockpit procedures; and numerous highly detailed and
technical matters relating to the operation of a large and ex-
tremely complex jet aircraft-all in the context of a Category
1158 landing at one of the world's busiest airports, which re-
quired the utmost in skill and concentration from two suitably
trained and qualified pilots. The crucial question for the jury
was, as stated by the trial judge, whether the defendant acted
improperly in the manner in which he instituted a go-around:
The criticisms of Capt. Stewart in terms of negligence were that
he did not respond to a series of cues warning him that it was
necessary to go round, and that after the warning lights came on
he took an unreasonably long time, 17 seconds, to switch to man-
ual and then another seven seconds to stop the aircraft from
descending.59
It is simply not possible here, nor would it be proper, to at-
tempt to criticise the jury's conclusion that Capt. Stewart was
guilty of endangering his aircraft for the reasons stated. The
issue under consideration here is no more than whether the
matter should have been tried in a court differently constituted.
It is submitted that there is simply no case for suggesting that,
because the case is immensely technical and involves the evalua-
tion of expert evidence, a pilot charged under the Air Naviga-
tion Order 1995 should be prosecuted under a different form of
procedure than usual. The problems of designing such a sepa-
rate system would be overwhelming.' One difficulty becomes im-
mediately apparent when one considers those occupations
where practitioners are in fact regulated by their peers. There is
no professional association charged with enforcing discipline
over pilots (such as those existing in the medical or legal profes-
sions). Characteristically, such professional associations are
charged with the duty of examining those who wish to enter the
58 These categories relate to the required precision of an instrument landing
system under different conditions of visibility. A "Category II" landing is one in
which an aircraft is allowed to land when the minimum runway visibility range is
as low as 400 metres, and the decision height (at which the attempt to land must
be discontinued if the runway cannot be seen) is 100 feet. A "Category III" land-
ing is one where the decision height is zero feet, and the visibility may be 200
metres or less. In a "Category IlIc" landing, the aircraft may land without seeing
the runway at all, and require guidance for the landing roll. See ICAO, Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation Annex 14, International Standards and Rec-
ommended Practices: Aerodromes, vol. 1, Aerodrome Design and Operations, at
2 (2d ed. 1995).
59 Cooper, supra note 47, at 14.
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profession, admitting those deemed to be properly qualified,
and exercising disciplinary control over those who are found to
have acted unprofessionally. No such structures or procedures
currently apply to pilots in the United Kingdom. Altering the
mode of trial to involve peer group 'evaluations, such as those in
other professions, would therefore seem to require improbable
and far-reaching structural changes in the profession.
IV. PROSECUTION POLICY
As argued above, one must be reluctant to criticise the out-
come of the November Oscar case with regard to the findings of
fact implicit in the jury's verdict. This, however, is not to say
that we can be at ease with the case, for it raises disturbing ques-
tions about the policy underlying the decision to prosecute. A
proper question to ask is whether the case should have been
tried in the first place.
One must bear in mind that once the decision was taken to
prosecute Capt. Stewart, he was then exposed to the inevitable
uncertainties of criminal litigation. Even with the clearest con-
science in the world, there remains an element of the unpredict-
able looming over the defendant: if one knows beforehand how
a court will decide a case, then what would be the point of pro-
ceeding to a trial? Sanders and Young write:
The rhetoric of English criminal justice is that priority is given to
protecting the actually innocent from wrongful conviction over
bringing the actually guilty to justice.... But even at this rhetori-
cal level the system can claim no more than to afford priority to
protecting the innocent. It cannot offer any guarantee against
miscarriage of justice occurring. The only way to guarantee this
would be not to prosecute anybody at all.60
The conclusion is that the decision to prosecute is a grave one,
fraught with potentially far-reaching consequences. It is not one
to be taken lightly, and it must be based on the clearest policy
considerations. It is instructive to consider the matter a little
further.
Prosecutions in England are generally undertaken by the
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Recognising the gravity of
the decision involved, the CPS has observed that "[t]he decision
whether or not to carry on a prosecution is a challenging re-
sponsibility. It can have a profound effect on the lives of individ-
Sanders & Young, supra note 56, at 3.
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uals, victims and their families and the public at large. The
conduct of a case is equally important."
61
Referring to the reasons why a prosecution may not proceed,
the CPS noted that a prosecution is less likely to be needed if,
amongst other factors, the offence was committed as a result of a
genuine mistake or misunderstanding 6 2-though this must be
balanced against the seriousness of the offence-or if the loss or
harm can be described as minor and was the result of a single
incident, particularly if it was caused by a misjudgment. 63
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), however, has not articu-
lated any specific policies, but considers that it complies with the
Code for Crown Prosecutors referred to above. 64 The CAA states
that it tends towards a compliance rather than a deterrence
strategy.65 Considering the policies of regulatory agencies such
as the CAA vis-a-vis the CPS, it is worth noting Professor Andrew
Ashworth's remarks, bearing in mind that he was addressing the
point in the context of the earlier 1992 Code for Crown Prosecutors.
He observed that it seems that the role of CPS in reviewing cases
cannot be transferred directly to the regulatory agencies:
They bring relatively few prosecutions, and it is assumed that
considerations of public interest have already been taken into ac-
count by the reluctance to prosecute save in clear and necessary
cases. However, those who have conducted research into these
agencies have pointed out that some prosecutions are brought
readily, in response to a single incident that has received public-
ity (perhaps through deaths, serious injuries, or an outbreak of
food poisoning) and that has revealed failure to comply with
legal standards. Such prosecutions could be examples of a form
of public interest reasoning . . .: that, where serious harm has
resulted, it is important to have a public airing of the issues and a
decision taken in a public forum about the appropriate disposal
of the case. On the other hand, they also demonstrate the dan-
61 CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1993-
MARCH 1994, H.C. 444, at 12 (1994-) [hereinafter 1993/94 ANNUAL REPORT].
62 CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, THE CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS 6.5
(1994) [hereinafter CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS]. The Code can also be
found in 1993/94 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 61, and in CROWN PROSECUTION
SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1994-MARCH 1995, H.C. 472
(1995).
63 CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS, supra note 62, at 10.
64 Personal communication from Gordon Sharp, Head of the Aviation Regula-
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ger of identifying the "public interest" too closely with
newsworthiness.66
The result, he continues, could be disproportionate attention to
safety rather than occupational health where deaths may be
more numerous.
67
It is important to note that, quite apart from deciding to com-
mence a prosecution, the CAA has the discretion to revoke, sus-
pend, or vary a pilot's license under the Air Navigation Order
1995.68 Indeed, it exercised this authority against Captain Stew-
art in the November Oscar case, for his air transport pilot's license
was altered to co-pilot status.69 These powers are accorded to
the CAA by virtue of its role as a regulatory agency, and their
exercise may thus be regarded as both alternatives and addi-
tional to the power to prosecute.
It is difficult to evaluate the CAA's policies with regard to the
prosecution of professional pilots in view of the fact that only
one such prosecution, the November Oscar case, appears to have
occurred. It is moreover not practical to compare one case or
set of facts with another in order to derive conclusions about the
relative degrees of blameworthiness involved or to use these
conclusions as the basis for drawing further conclusions about
decisions whether to prosecute. However, there is a body of ma-
terial, namely, the reports of the Air Accident Investigation
Branch of the Department of Transport (AAIB) in the United
Kingdom, where highly authoritative and critical judgments on
professional pilots' conduct are sometimes made. Even though
it is rare for professional pilots to follow AAIB investigations, an
examination of some of the incidents that were examined could
provide insight into the CAA's policies.
The sample discussed below is a selection drawn from recent
reports of the AAIB in which the AAIB investigators made ex-
plicit comments on the conduct of the aircrew in the incidents it
had investigated. There is, of course, no point in examining re-
ports where the investigators concluded that the conduct of the
pilots had no bearing on the development or outcome of an
accident or incident: a case, for example, where the pilot or
66 ANDREW ASHWORTH, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: AN EVALUATIVE STUDY 182-83
(1994).
67 Id. at 183.
68 Air Navigation Order 1995, supra note 3, at art. 71.
69 From the outset, Capt. Stewart protested that he was not at fault. He never
flew again, and subsequently committed suicide.
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crew could not have anticipated mechanical failure or severe
weather conditions. This type of incident has been disregarded.
A further point should be carefully noted. There is absolutely
no intention to suggest here that the pilots involved in the sam-
ple were guilty of criminal conduct or that any of them ought to
have been prosecuted-indeed, one can feel little but sympathy
for them. This point requires further explanation.
The conclusions of the AAIB investigators were of such a na-
ture that a strict application of the definition of recklessness as
considered above might suggest that the basis for a prosecution
under Articles 55 and 56 might have existed. In fact, in all the
incidents there were factors explicitly referred to by the investi-
gators and sometimes explored in considerable detail which,
while seemingly falling outside the definition of recklessness,
raise serious doubts nonetheless about the culpability of the pi-
lots. At the same time, the lack of clarity in prosecution policy
and the serious problems in the concept of recklessness as con-
sidered above become more apparent with examination of the
incidents investigated. It is submitted that these two matters are
interrelated. That the strict, formal definition of recklessness is
inadequate for the sample reveals that there are situations in
which a lawyer may think that its standard has been met, and yet
a prosecution would be inappropriate. The definition, in other
words, must be supplemented by the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion; the difficulty, however, is in understanding the rules
governing its application.
V. THE SAMPLE
One incident bears a coincidental similarity to November Os-
car.70 A Boeing 747-243 twice made a go-around due to a de-
flected approach when attempting to land at London Gatwick,
missing terminal buildings by one hundred feet. The investiga-
tors from the AAIB found that, apart from a failure of the
Autopilot/Flight Director System to capture and establish the
aircraft on the localiser, human error played a role in several
ways: first, the aircrew failed to appreciate that the navigational
information being presented to them on the flight deck was in-
deed correct; secondly, when the aircraft did a go-around, the
70 AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT, REPORT
ON THE INCIDENT TO BOEING 747-243, N33021 AT LONDON GATWICK AIRPORT ON 7
FEBRUARY 1993, at 28 (1994) [hereinafter NOVEMBER TwO ONE INCIDENT RE-
PORT]. The name November Two One is drawn from the aircraft's registration.
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commander failed to appreciate the extent of its displacement
from the centre line on its second approach and to take prompt
and effective action to regain the correct approach path; thirdly,
the radar director failed to appreciate the extent of the aircraft's
displacement from the centre line which caused him to pass mis-
leading information to the aircraft commander; and finally, the
commander improperly accepted the azimuth guidance given
by the radar director and the ILS glidepath information as ade-
quate references to continue the approach beyond the final ap-
proach point (FAP) .71 The inspectors were satisfied that there
was no evidence to suggest that the commander deliberately vio-
lated rules or procedures; however, they concluded that the de-
cision to continue both the first and second approaches past the
FAP, when the aircraft was outside the localiser course sector,
was ill-advised and contrary to company and internationally
recognised procedures. 72 The criticisms levelled against the
crew and the radar director were detailed and explicit. It is
noteworthy that this was an incident where an air traffic control-
ler was included in the AAIB's critical comments.
Certain comments need to be made about the November Two
One incident. As with November Oscar, it involved a precision ap-
proach and equipment which was believed to be faulty. This,
however, is merely the setting for an important distinction be-
tween the November Oscar and the November Two One incidents: in
the former there was no AAIB investigation, This appears to
have been due to the fact that, at the time of the November Oscar
incident, the AAIB's resources were wholly committed to the in-
vestigations into the terrorist bomb-attack on a Boeing 747 over
Lockerbie in Scotland and the crash of a Boeing 737 at
Kegworth near Manchester. 3 The latter incident is referred to
below. In response to the November Oscar incident, there was
only .a British Airways internal enquiry. The importance of this
becomes apparent when one realises that in November Two One
there was an opportunity for the AAIB to investigate and to re-
port on aspects of cockpit resource management. It seems rea-
sonable to assume that this influenced the CAA on the question
of a prosecution. The lack of an AAIB enquiry meant that no
examination of similar aspects of that incident was available with
regard to the November Oscar incident, and it can scarcely be
71 Id.
72 Id.




doubted that it featured greatly in the trial. If such evidence is
relevant, then it seems reasonable to express unease that the de-
cision to prosecute was taken without the benefit of an AAIB
report.
One must, however, understand the position the CAA was in,
for it was clearly a victim of circumstances. The public experi-
ence of the November Oscar incident clearly called for some expe-
ditious action, and doubtless the CAA felt that the best it could
do under the circumstances, with the limited resources available
at the time, was to refer the matter to a criminal court.
In another incident at Gatwick,7 a Boeing 737-2Y5A flying
from Malta to Gatwick missed the runway altogether and landed
on a taxiway. The AAIB found that the pilots did not brief
themselves adequately and that, had they done so, they would
have had a better chance of avoiding the incident because they
would have been better able to differentiate between the runway
and taxiway during the final stages of the approach. 7 There was
evidence (notably, conversations between the pilots recorded by
the cockpit voice recorder) indicating that the pilots had been
confused by the layout and lighting of the runways at Gatwick.
However, the investigators noted that the aircraft had been in a
holding pattern, giving the aircrew all the time needed to pre-
pare thoroughly for the landing. As in November Two One, the
criticism of the pilots was clear and explicit. If the test of reck-
lessness is as set out above,76 then clearly the CAA interpreted
the incident nonetheless as one in which a prosecution would
have been inappropriate.
The sample includes two incidents where a flight proceeded
without the declaration of an emergency and an urgent landing
followed the development of problems. In both incidents, the
AAIB investigators were critical of the conduct of the pilots.
In one incident,77 shortly after the Lockheed Tristar involved
took off from Frankfurt, Germany, en route to St. Lucia the air-
craft developed engine trouble and shed part of its thrust re-
74 AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT, REPORT
ON THE INCIDENT TO BOEING 737-2Y5A, 9H-ABA AT LONDON GATWICK AIRPORT ON
20 OCTOBER 1993 (1994).
75 Id.
76 See supra Part I.
77 AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT, REPORT
ON THE ACCIDENT TO LOCKHEED 1011 TRISTAR, 9Y-TGJ, NEAR "KIRN" VOR, GER-
MANY, ON 9 MARCH 1992 (1993) [hereinafter TRISTAR INCIDENT REPORT].'
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verser mechanism.7" The further damage this caused to the left
horizontal stabiliser as it fell away was later pointed out by a pas-
senger who had noticed it at the time and considered that it
appeared to be getting worse. Instead of declaring an emer-
gency.and landing as soon as possible, the commander decided
to divert to Heathrow, where the airline had a repair facility.
From the discussion captured by the cockpit voice recorder, the
AAIB investigators concluded that this unsatisfactory decision
was largely based on the inconvenience which the commander
and his crew would have experienced had they made an emer-
gency landing, rather than based on the condition of the air-
craft.79 The Heathrow air traffic control officer, however,
considered the matter to be so serious that on his own initiative
he treated the matter as if an emergency had been declared,
and offered London Stanstead-a much quieter airport-as a
diversion instead. He did so, however, without any explanation
to the commander of the disabled plane, who rejected the idea.
The air traffic controller had in mind the prospect that a heav-
ily-used runway at Heathrow might be blocked if the landing
went awry. The commander, though, thought that there was a
fear of allowing the aircraft to pass in its faulty condition over
the densely built-up area of London in order to land at
Heathrow. This would have been avoided if the aircraft had
landed at Stanstead. One recommendation made by the AAIB
as a result of this incident was that reasons should be given to
the commander when alternative airports are offered in order
to enable crews in emergency situations to make better-in-
formed decisions.80
In the second incident,81 a Boeing 747-436 operated by Brit-
ish Airways experienced a sharp nose-down change in attitude at
a height of one hundred feet while climbing away from
Heathrow and raising its undercarriage. This was caused by the
uncommanded full down travel of the right elevators, and it re-
quired almost full aft control column to counter until, a few
seconds, later, the controls responded correctly and a normal
78 It should be noted that the damage was merely the context within which
decisions were taken, and there was no suggestion that the conduct of the air
crew had caused it. Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT, REPORT
ON THE INCIDENT TO BOEING 747-436, G-BNLY AT LONDON HEATHROW AIRPORT
ON 7 OCTOBER 1993, at 23 (1995) [hereinafter LIMA YANKEE INCIDENT REPORT].
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rate of climb was resumed. The crew decided to continue with
.the flight. Considering the conduct of the aircrew, the investiga-
tors said,
Although they made every possible effort to identify the cause, as
no anomalies were displayed either by the engine indicating and
crew alerting system (EICAS) or by visual inspection, it was not
possible to do so. The crew therefore had to decide whether to
take what might be a serviceable aircraft back to Heathrow,
thereby delaying the whole schedule and causing severe incon-
venience to 389 passengers, or to carry on with a possible defect
which, although having apparently cured itself and leaving no
indication of its nature, might recur. The commander's initial
thought was that it was better to spend some time trying to iden-
tify the problem during the en route climb. However, during the
climb the crew were unable to discover anything further about
the incident and so there seemed to be nothing that they could
usefully discuss with the ground engineers.82
In their conclusions, the AAIB investigators found that: "In the
absence of information about the source of the disturbance, at
the time they were made, the decisions to continue the sector
and to continue to operate'the aircraft were questionable. It is
however recognised, with hindsight, that the associated risk was
minimal. 8
3
These two incidents demonstrate that, if recklessness involves
a subjective element, then it is relevant to consider what the pi-
lots knew. In the Tristar incident, the nature of the problem was
clearly observed by the crew; in the Lima Yankee incident, as the
AAIB investigators noted, the nature and seriousness of the
problem were not known.84 It does not seem unreasonable to
suggest that the commanders' decisions formed the basis of alle-
gations that the safety of the aircraft had been endangered and
that this might have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable
care on the part of the commander by dealing with the matter as
an emergency from the outset.
In two other incidents in the sample, routine landing checks
and procedures were riot followed. In the first,85 the co-pilot
82 Id. at 31.
83 Id.
84 The cause was subsequently traced with difficulty to a fault in a section of
the hydraulic system shared by the undercarriage mechanism and the right
elevators.
85 AIR ACCIDENTS INvESTIGATION BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT, REPORT
ON THE ACCIDENT TO CESSNA 550 CITATION II, G-JETB AT SOUTHAMPTON
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breached the procedure required by the Flight Manual by fail-
ing to warn the commander as he prepared to land that the fif-
teen-knot tail wind was outside the maximum allowed by the
Flight Manual. The air traffic control officer was recorded as
having said, when told of the decision to land, 'You'll be land-
ing with a fifteen knot, one five knot, tail wind on a very wet
runway." This radio transmission was acknowledged by the first
officer and heard by the commander. This incident is especially
noteworthy as it is one of those in the sample where there was
damage arising directly out of the conduct to which the AAIB
investigators drew attention: the aircraft skidded off the end of
the runway and onto a motorway where it struck several cars and
was destroyed in the ensuing fire. There was, remarkably, no
loss of life.
In the second incident,8 6 a BAe 146-300 was landing in a se-
vere cross-wind on a wet runway. The commander was preoccu-
pied with controlling the aircraft's attitude during the landing
and did not deploy the lift spoilers. The first officer reminded
the commander of the need to keep the up-wind wing down but
did not also alert him, as he was required to do by the Flight
Manual, to the need to deploy the lift spoilers. The aircraft
overshot and skidded off the runway; it was slightly damaged but
there was no harm to the crew or passengers. It was determined
in the subsequent investigation that the "spoiler not deployed"
warning lights were defective, and that this resulted in the crew
not being alerted to their error.
The final incident to be discussed involved the 8 January,
1984 crash of a Boeing 737-4007 operated by.British Midland
following the failure of one of the plane's two engines. When
the captain asked the first officer which engine had failed, the
first officer replied with the wrong information, and on the or-
der of the captain reduced power on the good one and shortly
thereafter shut it down entirely. By the time the error was dis-
covered, it was too late to avoid a crash which caused a great loss
of life. The first officer, at the enquiry, was unable to explain
(EASTLEIGH) AIRPORT ON 26 MAY 1993 (1994) [hereinafter CESSNA CITATION INCI-
DENT REPORT].
86 AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT, REPORT
ON THE INCIDENT TO BRITISH AEROSPACE 146-300, G-UKHP, AT ABERDEEN AIRPORT,
DYCE, SCOTLAND, ON 31 MARCH 1992 (1993.)
87 AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT, REPORT
ON THE INCIDENT TO BOEING 737-400, G-OBME, NEAR KEGWORTH, LEICESTER-
SHIRE, ON 8 JANUARY 1989 (1990) [hereinafter KEGWORTH INCIDENT REPORT].
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why he had made the mistake. A substantial portion of the
AAIB's report relates to the layout of engine instruments, and it
is clear that, notwithstanding the criticism made of the pilots,
the confusion was possibly related to unsatisfactory features
thereof. The AAIB investigators said that one engine was known
to be running improperly,
but because the first officer was unable to recall what he saw on
the instruments, it has not been possible to determine why he
made the mistake of believing that the fault lay with the No. 2
engine. When asked which engine was at fault he half-formed
the word "left" before saying "right." His hesitation may have
arisen from genuine difficulty in interpreting the readings on the
engine instruments, or it may have been that he observed the
instruments only during the 6 second period of relative stability
.... However, any uncertainty that he may initially have exper-
ienced appears to have been quickly resolved because, when the
commander ordered-him to "throttle it back," without specifying
which engine was to be throttled back, the first officer closed the
No. 2 throttle.8"
However, when considering further why the error happened,
the investigators concluded that in addition to the high work-
load and other matters which aggravated their problems,
the speed with which the pilots acted was contrary to both their
training and the instructions in the Operations Manual. If they
had taken more time to study the engine instruments it should
have been apparent that the No. 2 engine indications were nor-
mal and that the No. 1 engine was behaving erratically .... In
the event, both pilots reacted to the emergency before' they had
any positive evidence of which engine was behaving abnormally.
Their incorrect diagnosis of the problem must, therefore, be at-
tributed to their too rapid reaction and not to any failure of the
engine instrument system to display the correct indications.89 ,
It bears repeating here that no suggestion is being made that
the pilots and, in the case of the November Two One incident,90
the radar director, committed any offences in any of the above
incidents. It is simply not possible to pass such judgments here.
The sole point being made is that, despite the observations of
the AAIB, the CAA did not bring any prosecutions in these
cases. This, of course, is not to say that the CAA did not use
other powers it might have had, or would have used them had it
88 Id. at 97.
89 Id. at 98.
90 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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had the necessary jurisdiction over the pilots, not all of whom
were holders of British licences.
The failure to prosecute, however, simply means that the
criminal liability of the pilots was never tested. Had prosecu-
tions been brought, though, there could have been no confi-
dent prediction about the outcomes. For example, consider the
two incidents above where flights continued after problems had
developed. 91 Assuming that evidence were available that the pi-
lots knew that there might be defects in the aircraft which
gravely compromised safety, a reasonable jury properly in-
structed might well conclude that, in these two incidents, the
pilots had recklessly endangered the aircraft in failing to declare
emergencies and landing. One may recall that in R v.
Adomako92 recklessness was described as suggesting an indiffer-
ence to risk; and in R. v. Reid" this was described further as
posing the question whether "a reasonable man, in the defend-
ant's position, performing the very act which the defendant in-
tentionally performed, would have realised that he was exposing
another or others to an appreciable risk of injury or damage to
property. 94
The issue in the case in question, then, would be whether
there is evidence to put before the jury as to what a reasonable
pilot in the position of the pilots in those incidents would have
done; and as considered above, the testimony of other pilots
could be used. In the November Oscar case, this was done, and a
conviction followed. The deeper question, of course, is whether
one might wish to prosecute such cases at all. In addressing this,
however, one wishes to approach it with Consistent and clear
policies, and it is necessary therefore to ask what the objectives
of prosecuting professional pilots would be.
Let us assume, purely for the purpose of discussion, that in all
the incidents in the sample above, sufficient admissible and reli-
able evidence was considered to be available which would meet
the evidentiary test laid down by the Crown Prosecution Service
before deciding to proceed: that is, that there is a realistic pros-
pect of conviction. This is "an objective test. It means that a
jury or bench of magistrates, properly directed in accordance
91 See TRISTAR INCIDENT REPORT, supra note 77 and accompanying text; LiMA
YANKEE INCIDENT REPORT, supra note 81 and accompanying text.
92 [1994] 3 All E.R. 79 (1994); for discussion, see supra notes 20 and 21 and
accompanying text.
93 [1992] 3 All E.R. 673 (1992).
94 Id. at 683.
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with the law, is more likely than not to convict the defendant of
the charge alleged."95 Is there then any way we can distinguish
between November Oscar and the other incidents? If, as the as-
sumption is here, no question exists as to the sufficiency of evi-
dence, then the discriminating factor must be found in the
sphere of public policy and public interest.
Certainly, actual damage and loss of life do not appear rele-
vant, as in two of the incidents noted above an aircraft was to-
tally destroyed, and in one of the incidents, a great loss of life
occurred as well. Is the discriminating factor the degree of pub-
licity surrounding the incident? This factor was most certainly
present in the November Oscar case; the account of it by Wilkin-
son and the accompanying artist's impression leaves little doubt
about that. However, though there may have been little press
coverage, the unprosecuted incidents were at least within the
knowledge of the public, for there were passengers involved in
all but one of them; and in that incident,96 the aircraft crashed
and was destroyed on a busy motorway together with several
cars. The Kegworth incident 97 was attended by massive press cov-
erage over a protracted period.
A possible discriminant may be the actual or potential harm
involved. It is suggested that this is not a convincing analysis
either; there was a great death toll in the Kegworth incident, and
any of the other incidents in the sample might have led to loss
of life also. Admittedly, had the November Oscar incident
culminated in a crash, the probability is that the scale of the
disaster would have been comparable to the devastation caused
by the crash of an El Al Boeing that occurred in 1992 in a
densely-populated area in Amsterdam. The November Oscar inci-
dent could potentially' have been even worse than the El Al
crash, because that incident involved a freight plane, while the
November Oscar incident involved one of the largest passenger
aircraft in service which was carrying a full load of passengers.
Terrible as the death toll in the Kegworth crash was, it also was
less than would probably have occurred had the November Oscar
incident ended in a crash. However, it is unlikely that a govern-
ment agency would wish to be thought of as measuring the grav-
ity of an incident by counting the number of actual or potential
95 CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS, supra note 62, 1 5.1.
96 See CESSNA CITATION INCIDENT REPORT, supra note 85.
97 See KEGWORTH INCIDENT REPORT, supra note 87.
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dead. The scale of harm, whether actual or potential,. does not
appear to be relevant.
Attention must be drawn, however, to an important criterion
which the CPS does take into account when considering the
public interest being favoured by a decision not to prosecute.
The Code states, in relevant part, "A prosecution is less likely to
be needed if. . . the offence was committed as a result of a
genuine mistake or misunderstanding (these factors must be
balanced against the seriousness of the offence)." 98 It is sug-
gested that herein lies the answer-at least, in part. When ex-
amining the technical and other details of the incidents
described, it is not difficult to see how matters such as problems
of cockpit resource management, the layout of controls, and
other factors might have affected the conduct of the pilots. For
example, in the Cessna Citation incident the AAIB noted that the
commander was effectively the employee of the first officer, yet
the latter was a significantly less-experienced pilot who might
have felt inhibited from interfering with, and possibly taking
control away from, the commander at a critical moment; in the
Kegworth crash, the manufacturer's layout of the engine instru-
ments was the subject of critical comment by the AAIB and
might have affected the crew's judgment; and in the incident
involving the BAe 146, the weather conditions were so severe
that the first officer's warning might have been regarded as ap-
propriate and necessary but nonetheless a distraction from
other essential procedures that the warning lights would proba-
bly have rectified had they not been faulty. It may well be that
in the light of these factors the CAA decided that it would be
inappropriate to prosecute. However, it is difficult to see any of
these as a "genuine mistake or misunderstanding"; a better view
is that the CAA was attempting to extend the concept of "reck-
lessness" by importing a subjective element. This point will be
considered further below.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is not possible to reopen the November Oscar case, though
attention must be drawn to the considerable disquiet which the
prosecution evoked in the airline pilots' profession. It is submit-
ted, however, that the long-term issue which this case raises is
that, whether or not one uses the CPS's guidelines as a yardstick,
98 CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS, supra note 62, 6.5b.
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the CAA's policy for the prosecution of professional pilots is
problematic.
This is serious. The customs of the pilots' profession are in-
tensely focused on safety and the prevention of harm. It is this
sense of professionalism which seems to drive the Confidential
Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) which
is currently operating in the United Kingdom under the aegis of
the Defence Research Agency Centre for Human Sciences. It is
not usual for those engaged in an occupation to confess their
faults and to consent to their publication in the interests of
safety, albeit in strict anonymity, and solely among colleagues, as
CHIRP does in the newsletter it publishes. 99
There are, of course, also mandatory reporting procedures
which operate as part of an overall accident prevention policy.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) operates
an Accident/Incident Reporting System (ADREP) to collect and
disseminate what may be characterised as safety-related informa-
tion as a service to member states; 100 and under the Air Naviga-
tion Order 199510 every "reportable occurrence" involving a
public transport aircraft'0 2 must be reported to the CAA. This
covers:
(i) any incident relating to such an aircraft or any defect in or
malfunctioning of such an aircraft or any part or equipment of
such an aircraft, being an incident, malfunctioning or defect en-
dangering, or which if not corrected would endanger, the air-
craft, its occupants or any other person; and
(ii) any defect in or malfunctioning of any facility on the
ground used or intended to be used for purposes of or in con-
nection with the operation of such an aircraft, being a defect or
malfunctioning endangering, or which if not corrected would en-
danger, such an aircraft or its occupants.10
It would appear that these mandatory reports are forwarded
into the ICAO's ADREP system.
It does not seem unreasonable to expect that those authori-
ties charged formally with the regulation of the profession
would have a clear policy when the question of criminal liability
99 The newsletter, Feedback, is circulated only to pilots within the air transport
industry.
100 See Shawcross & Beaumont, supra note 9, VI(41.1).
101 Air Navigation Order 1995, supra note 3, at art. 106.
102 Id. at art. 106 (defining "reportable occurrence") and at art. 118 (defining
"public transport aircraft").
103 Id. at art. 106.
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arises. In the incidents in the sample, the AAIB investigators
were occasionally at pains to set out what they found that the
pilots knew about their emergency situations and the implica-
tions of this knowledge. At the same time, however, the investi-
gators also drew attention to a matrix of facts within.which this
knowledge was placed and which could not be disregarded
when assessing criminal liability. These fall within the sphere of
human factor matters or cockpit resource management, and
cannot be excluded. 10 4 For example, in the Cessna Citation inci-
dent," 5 severe weather affected the approach to the runway, but
the relationship between the commander and the first officer
was sufficiently significant to merit examination as well. The
commander was effectively the employee of the first officer, but
was in fact older and far more experienced; the investigators
clearly were concerned that the first officer felt inhibited about
intervening under the circumstances, especially as the com-
mander heard the warning by the air traffic controller. In the
Lima Yankee incident,10 6 there appeared to be a momentary, in-
explicable, self-curing problem on the one hand and, on the
other, enormous pressures on the pilots based on economics
and convenience. The human factor problems in the Kegworth
incident10 7 have already been noted. What is emerging is that
while it is one thing to conclude that, although a pilot knew all
that needs to be known to act differently, cognizance has to be
taken of those factors which militate against so acting. The defi-
nition of recklessness considered above is simply too barren to
cope reliably with the social or contextual need.
It is suggested that the definition of recklessness has been
worked out in fields which are so different from the context of
Articles 55 and 56 of the Air Navigation Order 1995 that, while
the definition might be a factor in making the discretionary de-
cision on whether or not to prosecute, it is by itself insufficient.
It is based on a concept of pure blameworthiness: if the defini-
tion of recklessness has been met, then criminal blameworthi-
ness must follow. The CAA properly appears to follow a
different course, and we must assume that in those incidents
where, hitherto, the choice has been made not to prosecute, it
was possibly made because the CAA considered using and possi-
104 For a recent discussion of this, see DAVID BEATY, THE NAKED PILOT: THE
HUMAN FACTOR IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS (1995).
105 See CESSNA CITATION INCIDENT REPORT, supra note 85.
106 See LIMA YANKEE INCIDENT REPORT, supra note 81.
107 See KEGWORTH INCIDENT REPORT, supra note 87.
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bly used its other powers instead with regard to licences. 10 8
However, the November Oscar incident is quite inconsistent with
this analysis.
Many of the incidents in CHIRP could be used as illustrations
in a debate amongst lawyers over the meaning of the term "reck-
less." The driving force behind CHIRP is the wish that all pilots
and Air Traffic Control officers should know about the incidents
reported, guard against their reoccurrence, and thereby partici-
pate in increasing safety by being alert to the factors which
caused them.
It may be a little cynical to note, but pilots obviously have a
particular interest in safety. Errors of judgment are markedly
less likely to have personal consequences of the same order for
surgeons than errors of judgment by pilots who, when things
start going wrong, are not in less danger than their passengers.
Apart from being what is undoubtedly a significant factor be-
hind the voluntary nature of CHIRP, this healthy self-interest
lends itself to sensible exploitation in the interests of the entire
airline industry. Concerning the standard for recklessness to-
day, in purely pragmatic terms, conduct is definitively reckless if
a properly-instructed jury decides that it is, as this paper reflects.
This highlights the importance of clear prosecution policies.
Looking abroad, it seems that there is as much uncertainty as
in the United Kingdom on prosecution policy. In an article
published in 1985, Phillip J. Kolczynski draws attention to a se-
ries of incidents where prosecutions have taken place.' 0 9 Assum-
ing that the fora have been in the countries where the alleged
offences occurred, he reports prosecutions in Egypt, Italy, Tai-
wan, Yugoslavia, and Greece."° More recently, Holahan and
Guibaud cite further instances of prosecutions in France and
India, and there can be little doubt that the list can be extended
greatly."' Kolczynski states that this is evidence of a greater will-
ingness to prosecute in other countries than in the United
States."1 It is submitted that this is not necessarily so, nor is it
clear what the significance is.
108 See supra text accompanying note 67.
109 Phillip J. Kolczynski, The Criminal Liability of Aviators and Related Issues of
Mixed Criminal-Civil Litigation: "A Venture in the Twilight Zone", 51 J. AIR L. & COM.
1 (1985).
110 Id. at 5-6 n.23.
- James Holahan & Stephane Guibaud, Euro-Pilots Who Err May Face Criminal
Charges, THE LOG, Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 11.
112 Kolczynski, supra note 109, at 5.
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What does emerge, however, is that there is some confusion
about policies in prosecuting, and that the United Kingdom is
not unique in this regard. It is noticeable that Kolczynski does
not distinguish between professional and other pilots. The
United States cases to which he refers constitute a heterogene-
ous collection and suggest some uncertainty on the part of the
responsible authorities as to prosecution policies. An interest-
ing comment Kolczynski makes is that "states sometimes react to
the nature of the tragedy and the spectacular circumstances of
an aviation accident rather than the conduct involved,"' 13 and
he argues that the determination of culpability should not be
governed by the gravity of the harm done. 1 4 It is respectfully
submitted that this latter point is correct. It does, however, raise
the question of the adequacy of the definition of recklessness.
When one considers the sheer volume of scheduled and char-
ter airline activity in the United Kingdom, it is apparent that the
skill and competence of professional pilots are outstanding, as is
their active involvement in, and sensitivity to, safety. A confused
prosecution policy does not serve such people well, and an ac-
count of one particular incident illustrates graphically the need
for clarity. The incident illustrates, firstly, the observation that
CHIRP reports frequently seem to describe what lawyers would
regard as reckless conduct by pilots; secondly, the need to con-
sider carefully whether every incident should be defined as crim-
inal; and, finally, how to discriminate. Clearly, a determination
must be made to decide why one would want to prosecute in the
first place.
In this incident, a commercial jet attempting to land had
twice been forced to overshoot by poor visibility. While in a
holding pattern and planning a diversion, the pilots heard that
another aircraft had just landed successfully. This information
persuaded them to make a third attempt: they agreed to de-
scend to, and then fly at, decision height until the runway could
be seen, and then to land. They did so but then, realising that
they had not been able to see the threshold lights, they were
forced to carry out a maximum-performance stop an unknown
distance down the runway; after which, the reporting pilot said,
1s Id. at 11.
"4 Id. at 5.
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the cockpit was filled with silence as they realised that they had
all been party to an act of""supreme folly."' 15
A lawyer would doubtless have little difficulty in describing
the crew's conduct as reckless, but herein lies a conundrum:
does this mean that a prosecution is necessarily the proper
course to follow? It seems to be clear that the three crew mem-
bers would have had self-images characterised by words such as
experienced, careful, safety-conscious, and competent. Other-
wise, why would they have been shocked by their own conduct
and reported the incident so as to warn others? One must be
clear about what a prosecution hopes to achieve in such a case
before proceeding.
It is not intended to offer an answer to this question within
the scope of this paper. The key issue seems to be to appreciate
that the meaning of recklessness has been sought and defined
in a very different context from the Air Navigation Order 1995.
The Order, as has been observed above, empowers the CAA to
take action on a pilot's license whatever the type, even in the
absence of a conviction of an offence. This is a very different
matter from the disqualification of offenders from driving, or
the suspension of a driving license, which are matters for the
criminal court that convicts a person of a driving offence. 116 The
other offences in which the concept of recklessness has been
considered have generally not been concerned with activities re-
quiring a license. It is suggested that this difference is
fundamental.
Conduct is definitively reckless only when a court has finally
decided that it is, and it is hard to see how the CAA's view of
what constitutes a proper case to prosecute cannot be affected
by the CAA's power to deal with a pilot's licence without taking
the matter to a criminal trial. This is, it is submitted, a reason-
able and proper situation, and is not a matter for criticism. But
it does also mean that the November Oscar case raises disturbing
issues and does not sit comfortably with what is known about
other incidents which have been the subject of full, independ-
ent enquiries. Where policies are unclear and contradictory,
115 Roger Green, Human Factors in Aircraft Accident Investigation, Address
Before the Advisory Grotip for Aerospace Research & Development (Aerospace
Medical Panel) (1992) (on file with author; Mr. Green's address on file with
Journal).
116 See generally Road Traffic Act, 1991, § 25; Road Traffic Offenders Act, 1988,
§ 27; 1 WILKINSON'S RoAD TRaffic OFFENSES (Peter Wallis et al. eds., 16th ed.
1993).
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the danger is that a lack of confidence will develop in the law
and procedure. This cannot be in the interests of safety.
